Free Access
RAIRO-Oper. Res.
Volume 54, Number 5, September-October 2020
Page(s) 1291 - 1307
Published online 16 June 2020
  • AgeInternational, Our ageing world, in statistics. (2018). [Google Scholar]
  • M. Akan, B. Ata and M.A. Lariviere, Asymmetric information and economies of scale in service contracting. Manuf. Ser. Oper. Manage. 13 (2011) 58–72. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  • S. Asian and X. Nie, Coordination in supply chains with uncertain demand and disruption risks: existence, analysis, and insights. IEEE Trans. Syst. Man Cybernet. Syst. 44 (2014) 1139–1154. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  • D. Barnes-Schuster, Y. Bassok and R. Anupindi, Coordination and flexibility in supply contracts with options. Manuf. Serv. Oper. Manage. 4 (2002) 171–207. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  • X. Brusset, When manufacturers hold information back from strong suppliers. RAIRO: OR 50 (2016) 553–565. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  • A. Burnetas, S.M. Gilbert and C.E. Smith, Quantity discounts in single-period supply contracts with asymmetric demand information. IIE Trans. 39 (2007) 465–479. [Google Scholar]
  • G.P. Cachon and M.A. Lariviere, Contracting to assure supply: How to share demand forecasts in a supply chain. Manage. Sci. 47 (2001) 629–646. [Google Scholar]
  • G.P. Cachon and F. Zhang, Procuring fast delivery: sole sourcing with information asymmetry. Manage. Sci. 52 (2006) 881–896. [Google Scholar]
  • C.J. Corbett and X. de Groote, A supplier’s optimal quantity discount policy under asymmetric information. Manage. Sci. 46 (2000) 444–450. [Google Scholar]
  • S. Ebrahimi, S.-M. Hosseini-Motlagh and M. Nematollahi, Proposing a delay in payment contract for coordinating a two-echelon periodic review supply chain with stochastic promotional effort dependent demand. Int. J. Mach. Learn. Cyber. 10 (2019) 1037–1050. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  • P. Egri and J. Vancza, Channel coordination with the newsvendor model using asymmetric information. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 135 (2012) 491–499. [Google Scholar]
  • Y.Y. Fu, E.W.T. Chui, W.S. Kan and L. Ko, Improving primary level home and community care services for older people: the case of hong kong. Int. J. Soc. Welfare 27 (2018) 52–61. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  • S.-M. Hosseini-Motlagh, M. Nematollahi, M. Johari and B.R. Sarker, A collaborative model for coordination of monopolistic manufacturer’s promotional efforts and competing duopolistic retailers’ trade credits. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 204 (2018) 108–122. [Google Scholar]
  • M. Jazinaninejad, M. Seyed Hosseini, S.-M. Hosseini-Motlagh and M. Nematollahi, Coordinated decision-making on manufacturer’s EPQ-based and buyer’s period review inventory policies with stochastic price-sensitive demand: a credit option approach. RAIRO: OR 53 (2019) 1129–1154. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  • Y. Jiang and A. Seidmann, Capacity planning and performance contracting for service facilities. Decis. Support Syst. 58 (2014) 31–42. [Google Scholar]
  • M. Johari, S.-M. Hosseini-Motlagh, M. Nematollahi, M. Goh and J. Ignatius, Bi-level credit period coordination for periodic review inventory system with price-credit dependent demand under time value of money. Transp. Res. Part E Transp. Rev. 114 (2018) 270–291. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  • Y. Li, X. Xu, X. Zhao, J.H.Y. Yeung and F. Ye, Supply chain coordination with controllable lead time and asymmetric information. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 217 (2012) 108–119. [Google Scholar]
  • L. Liang, X. Wang and J. Gao, An option contract pricing model of relief material supply chain. Omega 40 (2012) 594–600. [Google Scholar]
  • J.-Y. Lim, The effect of patient’s asymmetric information problem on elderly use of medical care. Appl. Econ. 39 (2007) 2133–2142. [Google Scholar]
  • J.-Y. Lim and C. Jo, The effect of patient’s asymmetric information problem on medical care utilization with consideration of a patient’s ex-ante health status. Hitotsubashi J. Econ. 50 (2009) 37–58. [Google Scholar]
  • H. Liu and O. Ozer, Channel incentives in sharing new product demand information and robust contracts. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 207 (2010) 1341–1349. [Google Scholar]
  • X. Liu, Q. Gou, L. Alwan and L. Liang, Option contracts: a solution for overloading problems in the delivery service supply chain. J. Oper. Res. Soc. 67 (2016) 187–197. [Google Scholar]
  • R.L. Mendoza, Information asymmetries and risk management in healthcare markets: the US affordable care act in retrospect. J. Econ. Issues 51 (2017) 520–540. [Google Scholar]
  • K.H. Miller, C. Ziegler, R. Greenberg, P.D. Patel and M.B. Carter, Why physicians should share PDA/smartphone findings with their patients: a brief report. J. Health Commun. 17 (2012) 54–61. [Google Scholar]
  • A.C. Muhlbacher, V.E. Amelung and C. Juhnke, Contract design: the problem of information asymmetry. Int. J. Integr. Care 18 (2018) 1. [Google Scholar]
  • R.B. Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem. Econometrica 47 (1979) 61–73. [Google Scholar]
  • M. Nematollahi, S.-M. Hosseini-Motlagh, J. Ignatius, M. Goh and M.S. Nia, Coordinating a socially responsible pharmaceutical supply chain under periodic review replenishment policies. J. Clean. Prod. 172 (2018) 2876–2891. [Google Scholar]
  • M. Nouri, S.-M. Hosseini-Motlagh, M. Nematollahi and B.R. Sarker, Coordinating manufacturer’s innovation and retailer’s promotion and replenishment using a compensation-based wholesale price contract. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 198 (2018) 11–24. [Google Scholar]
  • South China Morning Post, China Offers Incentives to Develop Elderly Care in Face of “Alarming” Population Ageing. South China Morning Post, Hong Kong (2015). [Google Scholar]
  • Y. Shen and S.P. Willems, Coordinating a channel with asymmetric cost information and the manufacturer’s optimality. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 135 (2012) 125–135. [Google Scholar]
  • P. Shi and W. Zhang, Private information in healthcare utilization: specification of a copula-based hurdle model. J. Roy. Statist. Soc. Ser. A (Statist. Soc.) 178 (2015) 337–361. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  • N. Shukla, J. Keast and D. Ceglarek, Modelling variations in hospital service delivery based on real time locating information. Appl. Math. Model. 38 (2014) 878–893. [Google Scholar]
  • T. Tran and R. Desiraju, Group-buying and channel coordination under asymmetric information. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 256 (2017) 68–75. [Google Scholar]
  • Department of Economic United Nations and Population Division Social Affairs. World population ageing 2017 –– highlights (st/esa/ser.a/397) (2017). [Google Scholar]
  • W. Xie, Y. Zhao, Z. Jiang and P.S. Chow, Optimizing product service system by franchise fee contracts under information asymmetry. Ann. Oper. Res. 240 (2013) 12. [Google Scholar]
  • H. Xu, Managing production and procurement through option contracts in supply chains with random yield. Int. J. Prod. Econ. 126 (2010) 306–313. [Google Scholar]
  • X. Xu, Y. Ji, Y. Bian and Y. Sun, Service outsourcing under co-opetition and information asymmetry. J. Oper. Res. Soc. 68 (2017) 666–677. [Google Scholar]
  • Y. Yan, R. Zhao and Y. Lan, Asymmetric retailers with different moving sequences: group buying vs. individual purchasing. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 261 (2017) 903–917. [Google Scholar]
  • Y.-H. Yan, C.-M. Kung, S.-C. Fang and Y. Chen, Transparency of mandatory information disclosure and concerns of health services providers and consumers. Int. J. Environ. Res. Publ. Health 14 (2017) 53. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  • L. Yang, R. Tang and K. Chen, Call, put and bidirectional option contracts in agricultural supply chains with sales effort. Appl. Math. Model. 47 (2017) 1–16. [Google Scholar]
  • Y. Zhao, S. Wang, T.C.E. Cheng and X. Yang, Z. Huang, Coordination of supply chains by option contracts: a cooperative game theory approach. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 207 (2010) 668–675. [Google Scholar]

Current usage metrics show cumulative count of Article Views (full-text article views including HTML views, PDF and ePub downloads, according to the available data) and Abstracts Views on Vision4Press platform.

Data correspond to usage on the plateform after 2015. The current usage metrics is available 48-96 hours after online publication and is updated daily on week days.

Initial download of the metrics may take a while.