| Issue |
RAIRO-Oper. Res.
Volume 47, Number 1, January-March 2013
|
|
|---|---|---|
| Page(s) | 47 - 58 | |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2013026 | |
| Published online | 07 March 2013 | |
Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting games∗
1
Combinatoire et Optimisation, IMJ, CNRS UMR 7586, Faculté de
Mathématiques, Université P. et M. Curie – Paris 6, Tour 15-16, 1 er étage, 4 Place
Jussieu, 75005
Paris
sorin@math.jussieu.fr; cheng.wan.2005@polytechnique.org
2
Laboratoire d’Econométrie, École Polytechnique,
France
Received:
30
April
2012
Accepted:
22
January
2013
This work studies a new strategic game called delegation game. A delegation game is associated to a basic game with a finite number of players where each player has a finite integer weight and her strategy consists in dividing it into several integer parts and assigning each part to one subset of finitely many facilities. In the associated delegation game, a player divides her weight into several integer parts, commits each part to an independent delegate and collects the sum of their payoffs in the basic game played by these delegates. Delegation equilibrium payoffs, consistent delegation equilibrium payoffs and consistent chains inducing these ones in a delegation game are defined. Several examples are provided.
Mathematics Subject Classification: 91A10 / 91A18
Key words: Basic integer-splitting game / delegation game / delegation equilibrium payoffs / consistent delegation equilibrium payoffs / consistent chains
© EDP Sciences, ROADEF, SMAI, 2013
Current usage metrics show cumulative count of Article Views (full-text article views including HTML views, PDF and ePub downloads, according to the available data) and Abstracts Views on Vision4Press platform.
Data correspond to usage on the plateform after 2015. The current usage metrics is available 48-96 hours after online publication and is updated daily on week days.
Initial download of the metrics may take a while.