| Issue |
RAIRO-Oper. Res.
Volume 52, Number 3, July–September 2018
|
|
|---|---|---|
| Page(s) | 935 - 942 | |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2017024 | |
| Published online | 26 October 2018 | |
A new axiomatization of a class of equal surplus division values for TU games
1
School of Management, Guangzhou University,
Guangzhou
510006, P.R. China.
2
School of Economics and Management, Fuzhou University,
Fuzhou
350108, P.R. China.
* Corresponding author: huxunfeng@gzhu.edu.cn
Received:
10
November
2016
Accepted:
31
March
2017
In this paper, we propose a variation of weak covariance named as non-singleton covariance, requiring that changing the worth of a non-singleton coalition in a TU game affects the payoffs of all players equally. We establish that this covariance is characteristic for the convex combinations of the equal division value and the equal surplus division value, together with efficiency and a one-parameterized axiom treating a particular kind of players specially. As special cases, parallel axiomatizations of the two values are also provided.
Mathematics Subject Classification: 91A12
Key words: TU game / equal division value / equal surplus division value / nullifying player / dummifying player
© EDP Sciences, ROADEF, SMAI 2018
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