Issue |
RAIRO-Oper. Res.
Volume 58, Number 5, September-October 2024
|
|
---|---|---|
Page(s) | 4437 - 4475 | |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2024148 | |
Published online | 14 October 2024 |
Models for dual-channel remanufacturing supply chain with reference price effect under static and dynamic games
1
School of Logistics and Management Engineering, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics, Kunming, Yunnan 650221, P.R. China
2
School of Business Administration, Hunan University, Changsha, Hunan 410082, P.R. China
3
School of Management, Xi’an Polytechnic University, Xi’an 710048, P.R. China
4
Academy of Mathematics and System Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, P.R. China
5
School of Economics and Management University, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, P.R. China
6
Prediction Science Research Center, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, P.R. China
7
School of Entrepreneurship and Management, ShanghaiTech University, Shanghai 201210, P.R. China
* Corresponding author: shutong@hnu.edu.cn
Received:
13
March
2023
Accepted:
21
July
2024
With the diversity of shopping styles, reference prices have become a consideration in consumers’ purchasing decisions. It is critical to understand how manufacturers and retailers make optimal decisions based on consumer behavior. To this end, we develop a manufacturer-led Stackelberg (M-Stackelberg) game model to investigate the impact of consumer proportion, reference price effect (RPE), and the channel preference coefficient on the decision of the remanufacturing supply chain (RSC) in dual-channel structures. Through comparing different game scenario models, we find that when the reference price coefficient is relatively small, the optimal decisions for the manufacturer and the retailer are the same regardless of whether the RPE is considered. The manufacturer and E-tailer always benefit from RPE, while the traditional retailer (T-retailer) is uncertain. The numerical analysis revealed that the profits of supply chain members are inversely proportional to the proportion of consumers. The smaller the proportion of primary consumers, the more favorable the supply chain. In particular, the higher the channel preference coefficient, the higher the profits of the manufacturer and E-tailer, while the lower the benefit of the T-retailer. Further, in the dynamic game, the total supply chain profit is highest when the T-retailer prices earlier than the E-tailer.
Mathematics Subject Classification: 35J20 / 35J25 / 35J60
Key words: Dual-channel supply chain / remanufacturing / reference price effect / pricing strategy / game theory
© The authors. Published by EDP Sciences, ROADEF, SMAI 2024
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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