Issue |
RAIRO-Oper. Res.
Volume 59, Number 4, July-August 2025
|
|
---|---|---|
Page(s) | 1775 - 1802 | |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2025047 | |
Published online | 14 July 2025 |
A game-theoretic approach for the government’s leadership to reduce misconduct in business
1
School of Industrial Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
2
School of Industrial Engineering, Islamic Azad University, South Tehran Branch, Tehran, Iran
3
Department of Industrial Engineering, Yonsei University, 50 Yonsei-ro, Sinchon-dong, Seodaemun-gu, Seoul 03722, South Korea
4
Department of Mathematics, Lovely Professional University, Phagwara, Punjab 144411, India
5
Center for Global Health Research, Saveetha Medical College, Saveetha Institute of Medical and Technical Sciences, Saveetha University, Chennai, Tamil Nadu 600077, India
* Corresponding author: bsbiswajitsarkar@gmail.com
Received:
25
April
2024
Accepted:
10
April
2025
Climate change forces the government to regulate policies in society furthermore, it has been proven that e-commerce is more carbon-efficient than traditional retail, so encouraging manufacturers to implement sustainable practices needs the effort of the government. The main issue of dual-channel is pricing. This study investigates the impact of government intervention on decision-making in the highly polluting leather industry, particularly within a dual-channel supply chain structure. To investigate the optimal decision between retailer and manufacturer in the dual-channel supply chain with government intervention, this study compares the effect of coordination contracts. In this model, the government, as a leader of the market, considers policy for the welfare of society. Maximizing the community’s well-being based on consumer surplus. This policy determines how much a customer pays for the tax of buying the green product. Green manufacturers open an online channel selling part of green products beside the retailer (offline channel). The result shows that a low-carbon contract is an effective mechanism to maximize social welfare and increase supply chain members’ profit. In the low-carbon contract, the decrease in the wholesale price causes the demand from offline channels to increase. In addition, low-carbon contracts have a powerful impact on the decrease in taxes paid by customers. Notably, reverse revenue and greening cost sharing, among other contracts, can increase the online demand for green manufacturers, while profit-sharing contracts can balance online and offline channels in the supply chain.
Mathematics Subject Classification: 90B05
Key words: Decision-making / convexity analysis / game policy / supply chain management / government tax
© The authors. Published by EDP Sciences, ROADEF, SMAI 2025
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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