| Issue |
RAIRO-Oper. Res.
Volume 60, Number 4, July-August 2026
|
|
|---|---|---|
| Page(s) | 1863 - 1906 | |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2026048 | |
| Published online | 13 July 2026 | |
Pricing and coordination strategies of dual-channel supply chain considering consumer channel preference with platform rebate
1
School of Modern Posts, Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chongqing 400065, P.R. China
2
Chongqing Municipal Education Commission Digital Economy Innovation and Industrial Development Research Team, Chongqing 400065, P.R. China
3
Key Laboratory of Big Data Intelligent Computing, Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Chongqing 400065, P.R. China
* Corresponding author: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.
Received:
16
September
2024
Accepted:
7
May
2026
Abstract
In dual-channel supply chains (DCSC), where firms operate both online and offline channels, traditional pricing and coordination models typically adopt fixed rebate structures. However, the interaction between consumer channel preference and platform rebate policies remains underexplored, leaving a gap in understanding their combined impact on pricing and coordination decisions. To address this issue, this study develops a Stackelberg game model to examine how consumer behavior and rebate flexibility jointly influence the strategic decisions of manufacturers, retailers, and platforms. Numerical simulations are further conducted to evaluate different consumer channel preference intensities and rebate adjustment scenarios. The results indicate that a stronger offline channel preference increases wholesale and retail prices, rebate levels, and retailer effort. Under manufacturer-led structures, consumers bear higher costs compared with centralized coordination, while in decentralized systems, flexible rebates play a crucial role in shaping profits and overall efficiency. The novelty of this research lies in integrating platform rebate mechanisms into the DCSC framework, providing new insights into how consumer channel preference drive pricing and coordination outcomes. Practically, the findings offer guidance for e-commerce supply chain managers to align rebate strategies with consumer behavior, thereby enhancing both strategic alignment and operational performance.
Mathematics Subject Classification: 91A80
Key words: Platform rebate / dual-channel supply chain / Stackelberg game / two-part pricing contract / cost-sharing contract
© The authors. Published by EDP Sciences, ROADEF, SMAI 2026
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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