Volume 48, Number 3, July-September 2014
|Page(s)||365 - 371|
|Published online||30 April 2014|
A note on robust Nash equilibria with uncertainties∗
Laboratoire de Probabilités et de Modèles Aléatoires, UMR 7599, Université Paris Diderot, 8 place FM/13, 75013 Paris, France
Received: 20 February 2013
Accepted: 6 November 2013
In this short note, we investigate the framework where agents or players have some uncertainties upon their payoffs or losses, the behavior (or the type, number or any other characteristics) of other players. More specifically, we introduce an extension of the concept of Nash equilibria that generalize different solution concepts called by their authors, and depending on the context, either as robust, ambiguous, partially specified or with uncertainty aversion. We provide a simple necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees its existence and we show that it is actually a selection of conjectural (or self-confirming) equilibria. We finally conclude by how this concept can and should be defined in games with partial monitoring in order to preserve existence properties.
Mathematics Subject Classification: 91A10 / 91B52
Key words: Robust games / robust Nash equilibria / uncertainties / partial monitoring / conjectural equilibria
© EDP Sciences, ROADEF, SMAI, 2014
Current usage metrics show cumulative count of Article Views (full-text article views including HTML views, PDF and ePub downloads, according to the available data) and Abstracts Views on Vision4Press platform.
Data correspond to usage on the plateform after 2015. The current usage metrics is available 48-96 hours after online publication and is updated daily on week days.
Initial download of the metrics may take a while.