| Issue |
RAIRO-Oper. Res.
Volume 48, Number 3, July-September 2014
|
|
|---|---|---|
| Page(s) | 373 - 379 | |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2014012 | |
| Published online | 30 April 2014 | |
Complementarities and the existence of strong Berge equilibrium
Department of Economics, Bilkent University, 06800 Ankara, Turkey
kerim@bilkent.edu.tr
Received: 31 May 2013
Accepted: 20 January 2014
This paper studies the existence and the order structure of strong Berge equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium, for games with strategic complementarities à la strong Berge. It is shown that the equilibrium set is a nonempty complete lattice. Moreover, we provide a monotone comparative statics result such that the greatest and the lowest equilibria are increasing.
Mathematics Subject Classification: 91B52 / 47H10
Key words: Strong Berge equilibrium / refinement / games with strategic complementarities / fixed point theory / supermodularity
© EDP Sciences, ROADEF, SMAI, 2014
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