Issue |
RAIRO-Oper. Res.
Volume 58, Number 1, January-February 2024
|
|
---|---|---|
Page(s) | 475 - 510 | |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2023190 | |
Published online | 19 February 2024 |
Evolutionary game of digital decision-making in supply chains based on system dynamics
1
School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu 611731, Sichuan, P.R. China
2
Business School, Southwest University for Nationalities, Chengdu 611731, Sichuan, P.R. China
3
School of Economics and Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400000, P.R. China
* Corresponding author: zd324@126.com
Received:
28
December
2022
Accepted:
7
December
2023
This paper primarily focuses on whether supply chains enterprises adopt a digital strategy and the impact of various government measures on supply chain digital decision-making. The study develops a multi-agent decision-making evolutionary game model to examine the stability of decision-making among the government, suppliers, and manufacturers. Additionally, a system dynamics model is established to analyze the governing dynamics within the supply chain’s digital decision-making process, identifying characteristic patterns and trends. The analytical results of this study illustrate the government’s strength thresholds exist regardless of ex-part penalties or the mix of rewards and punishment. Once the government’s strength exceeds these thresholds, the evolutionary game system undergoes abrupt changes. Suppliers and manufacturers who adopt digital strategies are more affected by government penalties than incentives. The stronger the mix of government incentives and penalties, the higher the incentives for the supplier and the manufacturer to adopt a digital strategy, but the lower the incentives for the government to choose a regulatory strategy. Low-intensity mixed rewards and punishments, as well as low-intensity government rewards, are effective mechanisms for promoting government decision-making and supervision. Conversely, high government penalties do not motivate governments to choose regulatory strategies. The unit cost of products to deploy digital strategies directly affects the final digital strategy choice of supply chain enterprises. To choose a digital strategy, supply chain companies must ensure that the unit cost of products remains within a reasonable range.
Mathematics Subject Classification: 90B06
Key words: Digital supply chain / multi-agent / evolutionary game / system dynamics
© The authors. Published by EDP Sciences, ROADEF, SMAI 2024
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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