| Issue |
RAIRO-Oper. Res.
Volume 58, Number 2, March-April 2024
|
|
|---|---|---|
| Page(s) | 1093 - 1103 | |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2024017 | |
| Published online | 12 March 2024 | |
Price of Anarchy in uniform parallel machines scheduling game with weighted completion time as social goal
1
Department of Industrial Engineering, Universidad del Bío-Bío, Concepción, Chile
2
Faculty of Engineering, Universidad del Bío-Bío, Concepción, Chile
* Corresponding author: fmunoz@ubiobio.cl
Received:
12
September
2022
Accepted:
21
January
2024
This article investigates the efficiency of Nash equilibria in a utilitarian scheduling game, where each job, acting as an agent, strategically selects a machine for its processing. The study focuses on a uniform parallel machine environment, employing the Weighted Shortest Processing Time rule as the local policy and the total weighted completion time as the social goal. We establish upper and lower bounds for the Price of Anarchy, offering valuable insights for this scheduling game.
Mathematics Subject Classification: 91A10 / 91B14 / 90B35
Key words: Price of anarchy / scheduling game / uniform parallel machines / weighted completion time
© The authors. Published by EDP Sciences, ROADEF, SMAI 2024
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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