Issue |
RAIRO-Oper. Res.
Volume 58, Number 4, July-August 2024
|
|
---|---|---|
Page(s) | 2797 - 2815 | |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2024094 | |
Published online | 15 July 2024 |
Diffusion model of multi-agent collaborative behavior in public crisis governance network based on complex network evolutionary game
1
School of Business, Shenyang University, Shenyang 110064, P.R. China
2
School of Information Management, Nanjing University, Nanjing 210023, P.R. China
3
Business Research Institute, Beijing College of Finance and Commerce, Beijing 101101, P.R. China
4
School of Business, Dongguk University, Seoul 04620, South Korea
* Corresponding author: rose_1844100@cueb.edu.cn
Received:
22
February
2023
Accepted:
26
April
2024
In order to explore the phenomenon of diffusion of group decision making formed by the emergence of decision-making behaviors of governance agents in public crisis governance systems, this research uses a complex network evolutionary game approach, considers BA scale-free networks as network vectors of public crisis governance systems, and develops a diffusion model of collaborative governance decision making behaviors. Simulation experiments are also conducted to show the macro-level impact of micro-subjects’ decision-making behavior on group “Emergence-Diffusion”. The results of this study show that the cost of collaborative governance has the most significant effect on the depth and breadth of the spread of collaborative behavior in governance networks. The size of the network determines the speed of network diffusion. The smaller the network size, the more sensitive it is to the spillover benefits of collaborative governance, and the larger the network size, the more sensitive it is to the penalties of non-compliance. The findings of the study have implications for the collaborative behavior of multiple agents in public crisis governance. The main findings are that (1) in order to ensure the stability of the collaborative governance system, decision making options should be selected according to the size of the network. (2) A reasonable penalty mechanism for breach of contract should be set up to avoid the phenomenon of “free-riding” in collaborative governance. (3) Reasonable allocation of collaboration benefits and maintenance of cooperative relationships between nodes in the neighborhood. (4) External regulators should ensure that information in the network is disseminated without barriers and reduce the phenomenon of information asymmetry.
Mathematics Subject Classification: 90B05
Key words: Public crisis / multi-agent collaborative governance / diffusion of governance behavior / complex network evolutionary game / EWA learning model
© The authors. Published by EDP Sciences, ROADEF, SMAI 2024
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Current usage metrics show cumulative count of Article Views (full-text article views including HTML views, PDF and ePub downloads, according to the available data) and Abstracts Views on Vision4Press platform.
Data correspond to usage on the plateform after 2015. The current usage metrics is available 48-96 hours after online publication and is updated daily on week days.
Initial download of the metrics may take a while.