Analysing the impact of carbon regulation policies on the clean energy advertisement input decision

¹ Institute of Electronic and Information Engineering of UESTC in Guangdong, Dongguan 523808, P.R. China
² College of Management Science, Chengdu University of Technology, Chengdu 610059, P.R. China
³ Energy and Environment Carbon Neutrality Innovation Research Center, Chengdu 610059, P.R. China

^* Corresponding author: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Received: 11 June 2024
Accepted: 1 February 2026

Abstract

This study introduces a novel ceiling constraint on clean energy advertisement input and examines its interaction with two carbon regulation policies carbon tax (CT) and carbon allowance mechanism (CAM) in shaping operational decisions. The key findings are as follows: (1) Under a low ceiling, both policies lead to identical advertisement input, yet CT results in lower profits for chain members. Under a moderate or high ceiling, CAM induces higher advertisement input than CT. (2) Regardless of the ceiling level, CAM consistently leads to higher power demand, higher total emissions, and lower conventional power prices compared to CT. (3) When the ceiling constraint is binding, raising it reduces conventional power prices, power demand, and emissions under both policies, while increasing the equilibrium values for other decision variables. Theoretical and managerial contributions: Theoretically, this study advances low-carbon operations modeling by incorporating a regulatory ceiling on advertisement input, offering a refined framework for evaluating carbon policies. It further identifies critical threshold levels (e.g., of the ceiling) that dictate the relative efficacy of CT versus CAM in promoting green input and shaping profitability. From a managerial perspective, the findings offer clear guidance; policymakers can use them to design balanced regulations, while power generators can better select operational strategies under different policy regimes.