Debt financing in a duopoly with asymmetric costs

Open Access

Issue		RAIRO-Oper. Res. Volume 57, Number 1, January-February 2023


Page(s)		201 - 218
DOI		https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2023004
Published online		15 February 2023

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