Open Access
Issue |
RAIRO-Oper. Res.
Volume 58, Number 5, September-October 2024
|
|
---|---|---|
Page(s) | 3733 - 3753 | |
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2024128 | |
Published online | 24 September 2024 |
- M.J. Albizuri, An axiomatization of the modified banzhaf coleman index. Int. J. Game Theory 30 (2001). [Google Scholar]
- M.J. Albizuri, Axiomatizations of the owen value without efficiency. Math. Soc. Sci. 55 (2008) 78–89. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- E. Algaba, J.M. Bilbao, P. Borm and J.J. López, The myerson value for union stable structures. Math. Methods Oper. Res. 54 (2001) 359–371. [CrossRef] [MathSciNet] [Google Scholar]
- E. Algaba, J.M. Bilbao, R. Van den Brink and A. Jiménez-Losada, Cooperative games on antimatroids. Discrete Math. 282 (2004) 1–15. [CrossRef] [MathSciNet] [Google Scholar]
- E. Algaba, J.M. Bilbao and M. Slikker, A value for games restricted by augmenting systems. SIAM J. Discrete Math. 24 (2010) 992–1010. [CrossRef] [MathSciNet] [Google Scholar]
- J. Alonso-Meijide, F. Carreras, M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro and G. Owen, A comparative axiomatic characterization of the banzhaf–owen coalitional value. Decis. Support Syst. 43 (2007) 701–712. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- R. Amer, F. Carreras and J.M. Gimnez, The modified banzhaf value for games with coalition structure: an axiomatic characterization. Math. Soc. Sci. 43 (2002) 45–54. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- R.J. Aumann and J.H. Dreze, Cooperative games with coalition structures. Int. J. Game Theory 3 (1974) 217–237. [Google Scholar]
- J.F. Banzhaf III, Weighted voting doesn’t work: A mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Rev. 19 (1964) 317. [Google Scholar]
- J.M. Bilbao, Cooperative games under augmenting systems. SIAM J. Discrete Math. 17 (2003) 122–133. [CrossRef] [MathSciNet] [Google Scholar]
- J.M. Bilbao and P.H. Edelman, The shapley value on convex geometries. Discrete Appl. Math. 103 (2000) 33–40. [CrossRef] [MathSciNet] [Google Scholar]
- A. Casajus, An efficient value for tu games with a cooperation structure. Universitat Leipzig, Leipzig, Germany, Working paper (2007). [Google Scholar]
- A.P. Dempster, Upper and lower probabilities induced by a multivalued mapping. Ann. Math. Stat. 38 (1967) 325–339. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- J.J.M. Derks and R.P. Giles, Hierarchical organization structures and constraints on coalition formation. Int. J. Game Theory 24 (1995) 147–163. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- U. Faigle and W. Kern, The shapley value for cooperative games under precedence constraints. Int. J. Game Theory 21 (1992) 249–266. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- I. Gallego Sanchez, Cooperative Games Restricted by Fuzzy Graphs. Instituto de Matematicas de la Universidas de Sevilla (2016). [Google Scholar]
- R.P. Gilles, G. Owen and R.V.D. Brink, Games with permission structures: the conjunctive approach. Int. J. Game Theory 20 (1992) 277–293. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- M. Grabisch and L. Xie, The restricted core of games on distributive lattices: how to share benefits in a hierarchy. Math. Methods Oper. Res. 73 (2011) 189–208. [CrossRef] [MathSciNet] [Google Scholar]
- S. Hart and M. Kurz, Endogenous formation of coalitions. Econom.: J. Econom. Soc. (1983) 1047–1064. [Google Scholar]
- X.-F. Hu, G.-J. Xu and D.-F. Li, The egalitarian efficient extension of the aumann–drèze value. J. Optim. Theory Appl. 181 (2019) 1033–1052. [CrossRef] [MathSciNet] [Google Scholar]
- G. Koshevoy and D. Talman, Solution concepts for games with general coalitional structure. Math. Soc. Sci. 68 (2014) 19–30. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- G. Koshevoy, T. Suzuki and D. Talman, Cooperative games with restricted formation of coalitions. Discrete Appl. Math. 218 (2017) 1–13. [CrossRef] [MathSciNet] [Google Scholar]
- D.L. Li and E. Shan, Cooperative games with partial information. Int. J. Game Theory 50 (2021) 297–309. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- Z. Li and F. Meng, The probabilistic harsanyi power solutions for probabilistic graph games. RAIRO:RO 57 (2023) 2873–2887. [CrossRef] [EDP Sciences] [Google Scholar]
- R.B. Myerson, Graphs and cooperation in games. Math. Oper. Res. 2 (1977) 225–229. [CrossRef] [MathSciNet] [Google Scholar]
- R.B. Myerson, Conference structures and fair allocation rules. Int. J. Game Theory 9 (1980) 169–182. [Google Scholar]
- G. Owen, Values of games with a priori unions. In: Mathematical economics and game theory: Essays in honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Springer (1977) 76–88. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- G. Owen, Modification of the banzhaf-coleman index for games with a priori unions. In: Power, voting, and voting power. Springer (1981) 232–238. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- G. Shafer, A Mathematical Theory of Evidence, Vol. 42. Princeton university press (1976). [Google Scholar]
- L.S. Shapley, A value for n-person games. Ann. Math. Stud. (1953). [Google Scholar]
- M. Slikker and A.V.D. Nouweland. Social and Economic Networks in Cooperative Game Theory, Vol. 27. Springer Science & Business Media (2012). [Google Scholar]
- H.-X. Sun and Q. Zhang, An axiomatization of probabilistic owen value for games with coalition structure. Acta Math. Appl. Sin. Engl. Ser. 30 (2014) 571–582. [CrossRef] [MathSciNet] [Google Scholar]
- R. Van Den Brink, An axiomatization of the disjunctive permission value for games with a permission structure. Int. J. Game Theory 26 (1997) 27–43. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
- R. van den Brink, Gerard van der Laan, and Nigel Moes. Values for transferable utility games with coalition and graph structure. Top 23 (2015) 77–99. [CrossRef] [MathSciNet] [Google Scholar]
- X. Yu, M. He, H. Sun and Z. Zhou, Uncertain coalition structure game with payoff of belief structure. Appl. Math. Comput. 372 (2020) 125000. [MathSciNet] [Google Scholar]
Current usage metrics show cumulative count of Article Views (full-text article views including HTML views, PDF and ePub downloads, according to the available data) and Abstracts Views on Vision4Press platform.
Data correspond to usage on the plateform after 2015. The current usage metrics is available 48-96 hours after online publication and is updated daily on week days.
Initial download of the metrics may take a while.