Open Access
| Issue |
RAIRO-Oper. Res.
Volume 58, Number 2, March-April 2024
|
|
|---|---|---|
| Page(s) | 1899 - 1925 | |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2024062 | |
| Published online | 19 April 2024 | |
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